Le vote de crise: Lélection présidentielle de 1995 (Chroniques électorales) (French Edition)
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I leverage a panel dataset from the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada, which tracks every communication initiated by a lobbyist with designated public office holders, to assess the effects of these rules changes. I employ a difference-in-differences inspired design to compare Senators and their House of Commons peers and then distinct groups within the Senate who I find are differential recipients of increased lobbying attention.
This paper evaluates existing theories on bicameralism and pushes the literature to more seriously examine non-constitutional refinements and the political behaviour of legislators and supporting players, offers a measure by which relative legislator influence can be measured in complex legislative environments, and contributes to the extant Canadian literature on the Senate, lobbyists, and the legislative process.
Taking advantage of a uniquely designed survey experiment, this paper investigates the impact of the input type of vote choice and party supply and the output party performance and the conversion of votes into seats of electoral rules on voter satisfaction in four countries, namely Austria, England, Ireland and Sweden.
All in all, output factors play a larger effect on voter satisfaction compared to input factors. Immigration and integration-based concerns have heavily influenced politics across the developed world in recent years. While positions on race and immigration have generally been front and center during political contests, the Canadian federal election saw immigration and religious accommodation only emerge as an important issue towards the end of the campaign period.
We seek to identify the causal effect of this shock through two empirical strategies that distinguish the effect in Quebec from that in the other Canadian provinces. First, we leverage the rolling cross-section design of the Canadian Election Study and, in a difference-in-differences before- and after setting, we estimate the causal effect of the court decision; second, we also use synthetic control method to build a counterfactual of the NDP support had the court ruling not happened and compare it to the actual evolution of the party in the polls, all while controlling for other campaign shocks.
Despite the post-election perception that the NDP stance hurt their support particularly in Quebec , the preliminary findings rather point towards a null effect; the NDP vote intention collapses in the last two weeks of the campaign which suggests a strategic voting effect. Our paper contributes to the literature on campaign effects and to the religious symbols, race and immigration literature.
A thorough understanding of the education-participation nexus is thus all the more important. However, existing research on education-based turnout inequality is characterized by a neglect of institutional differences in education systems: While macro-level turnout studies focus on non-educational institutions and their interactions with education, individual-level studies seem to assume that education has the same effect across countries.
Combining the turnout literature with research on education systems from comparative political science, sociology and economics, I argue that institutional set-up of national education systems moderates the education-turnout nexus. Ces changements ont eu des effets structurants majeur sur le fonctionnement des partis. In this talk, we present mapcan, an R package that provides convenient tools for plotting Canadian choropleth maps and choropleth alternatives. Standard choropleth maps tend to produce visually misleading evidence, overemphasizing larger geographical units by assigning them a stronger visual weight.
This is particularly true in the Canadian case, where vast, sparsely populated geographic units in the north are given far stronger visual weights than units in southern urban centers with far denser populations. As a result, it is often the case that standard choropleth maps are either uninformative or misleading when it comes to visualizing statistics for Canadian geographic units e. In recent years, cartograms, tile grid maps, and hexagonal bin maps have become popular alternatives to this problem of area size bias. The goal of mapcan is to adapt these tools to the Canadian context and make them easy to implement with R and ggplot.
The package includes tile grid, cartogram, and standard geographic data at different boundary levels census divisions, federal ridings, Quebec provincial ridings, and provinces as well as flexible functions that make it easy to plot these data. Armies frequently attempt to maintain control by monitoring soldiers and punishing them for disloyalty.
But coercion is a double-edged sword. The difficulty is in assurance: convincing the agent that they will not be punished despite complying. In this paper, I provide quantitative evidence that widespread, ideologically-reinforced fears about the disloyalty of soldiers, particularly certain categories of soldiers, simultaneously incite the use of violence and limit its effectiveness by undermining assurance.
In essence, members of a group that is constructed as disloyal by a prevailing ideology are likely to perceive violence against other group members as arbitrary. I trace how violence can undermine assurance and provoke defection using micro-level data on the officer corps in the Spanish Civil War With a prevailing view that officers were disloyal and with a failed military coup attempt that initiated the war, the officers who remained in government territory came under considerable suspicion, and many were executed. I find, in turn, that these executions provoked further defection, and I examine how they did so.
I find in particular that officers reacted to violence in their immediate networks, groups formed by officers serving in the same corps and in the same province, particularly when that group had participated little in the coup attempt at the outset of the war and so violence against them appeared especially arbitrary. And does gender intersect with other identities - such as ethnicity - to impact attendance at political discussion groups?
Citizens are increasingly involved in the design of democratic institutions. If they support the institution that best serves their self-interest, the outcome inevitably advantages the largest group and disadvantages minorities. In this paper, we challenge this pessimistic view with an original lab experiment in France and Great Britain.
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In the second phase, they decide which rule they want to use for an extra election. Et pourquoi? Ballot secrecy is a cornerstone of electoral democracy, since its real or perceived absence can make voters reluctant to express their true preferences when faced with individually-targeted incentives or punishments. Through original survey data from Singapore, we show that doubts over ballot secrecy can alter voting behavior even when the vote is secret and the perceived potential individual punishments are soft.
Estimating counterfactual results in an election free of doubts suggests important effects: the doubts provide the dominant party with a modest buffer against opposition challenges that can potentially sway competitive districts. As such, we highlight an essentially costless mechanism that relies on passive acceptance of the dominant party—rather than pronounced fear—through which single party dominance is buttressed. We also provide evidence of limitations of list experiments and recommendations to overcome such limitations.
Turnout rates are low and declining in many Western democracies, especially among younger generations. Scholars and public institutions have thus paid increasing attention to the socialization of children, to understand where, when and how contemporary children learn democratic citizenship.
Despite the growing research attention on the topic of populism, less attention has been devoted to the study of populist attitudes among the citizenry. This study reports an overview of the measurement scales of this concept, aiming to bring more clarity to this field of study, and to serve as a guide to researchers who want to measure this concept accurately. To do so, first, we explore how populist attitudes have been measured in the literature until now, examining the historical development of the operationalization of populism, and the different dimensions it is composed of.
We compare previously used indicators and the theoretical framework that inspired them. Second, we identify areas of agreement between scholars, and overlaps with other political attitudes. Third, we test the robustness of these measurements with methodological tools such as Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis, testing their validity and internal consistency.
After, we propose which exact measurement of these attitudes is recommended to be used. Finally, we validate the measure proposed by means of voting behavior, testing whether populist attitudes correspond with the vote for a populist party. Cross-national data will be used for this purpose.
In this study, I argue that voters are more likely to cast a protest vote when they perceive their most preferred choice to lack ideological congruence and the competence to deliver on important policy issues. While much ink has been spilled on protest voting, there appears to be little consensus among scholars on what precisely this voting model entails.
Voters can utilize their vote to voice their discontent and send a message by temporarily withdrawing their support from the option that they would choose if were they not dissatisfied. Broadly speaking, protest voting is a form of strategic voting because voters cast an insincere vote.
However, protest voters are different from strategic voters as strictly, and typically, defined in the literature in that their primary goal is not to influence the immediate election outcome. As turnout in many democracies is in decline, the scholarly and public interest in compulsory voting rules has increased. Compulsory voting is found to be one of the most effective ways to boost turnout.
However, its secondary effects are more debated. On the one hand, research finds that inequalities in voting in terms of e. As such, compulsory voting rules make electoral participation more egalitarian and should - in this way - ensure that the interests of the less well-off are represented.
Research that has studied the prevalence of proximity voting in compulsory and non-compulsory voting countries finds that compulsory voting rules tend to weaken the impact of ideological proximity on the vote choice Singh ; Dassonneville et al. The implication is that the compelled less well-off do not necessarily cast votes that are in line with their interests. As a consequence, while we know that compulsory voting rules reduce inequalities in electoral participation, we are less certain about its alleged impact on inequalities in political representation.
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We make use of the comparative data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems CSES -project, that includes survey data from compulsory and non-compulsory voting countries. Our results testify of the egalitarian impact of compulsory voting rules. We find that compulsory voting not only reduces income inequalities in participation, but also income inequalities in representation. Economic voting is one of the most widely investigated theories of voting behaviour, and previous research has indicated the importance in political information to enable voters to link their retrospective assessments of the government's performance to their vote.
This study aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the role of information in retrospective voting, by investigating both political information at the individual level, the clarity of the political context, and the interplay of these two sources of heterogeneity. Second, voters do not vote retrospectively in the lowest-clarity context. These findings hold strong implications for the way elections work as a means of democratic accountability.
My past comparative work focused on Europe, but recent events have returned me to my original interest in the US. Very much is being written about Trump by journalists and pundits, but more political science analysis needed. There is a burgeoning literature on populism, but we need to include the US in the comparative analysis of populism.
I outline what such an analysis should entail. Accounting for Differences in Canadian Federal Culture. These lead to strong federal cultures that are characterized by support of the citizens for the institutions and functions of federalism. However, what drives federal culture? The ways in which federal systems are divided create an opportunity for the diversity of policies, parties and even opinions. These regional cleavages can have serious implications for citizens and the way they relate to the federal polity. In this paper, we use survey data to explore whether territorial factors are stronger determinants of federal culture than socio-demographic characteristics and ideology.
To study gender differences in candidate emergence, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which we control the incentives potential candidates face, manipulate features of the electoral environment, and measure beliefs and preferences. We find that men and women are equally likely to volunteer when the representative is chosen randomly, but that women are less likely to become candidates when the representative is chosen by an election. This difference does not arise from disparities in abilities, risk aversion, or beliefs, but rather from the specific competitive and strategic context of campaigns and elections.
Election aversion persists with variations in the electoral environment, disappearing only when campaigns are both costless and completely truthful. This is a project proposal. These authors generally conclude that citizens thus fail to lead government policy. In other words, the shortcomings of their political behavior prevent them from getting what they want from government. Using the Swedish National Election Studies data going back to , we consider the extent to which governing parties gain and lose votes among supporters and opponents of a variety of policy proposals.
By combining the election studies data with an original dataset on policy implementation, we show that gains by governing parties lead to policy outcomes that are more reflective of public opinion. This paper examines the seminal spiral of silence hypothesis through a survey experiment conducted in Japan. While the existing studies either rely on hypothetical questions in surveys or experiments with selected samples, we tested the hypothesis with a real on-going issue in Japan regarding the future of nuclear power plants after the Fukushima crisis based on nationwide random samples.
In our experiment, different stimuli of climates of opinion and survey modes were randomly assigned to respondents based on a computer assisted survey program. Our results demonstrate the spiral of silence and the crescendo of voicing a majority view phenomenon for above groups of respondents and this was only confirmed in the CAPI mode while not in the CASI Computer Assisted Self-administered Interview mode where respondents complete the questionnaire in privacy by themselves.
While the ill consequences of corruption are well documented and seem clear for both scholars and citizens, corrupt candidates are often not punished by voters. The paper tests three possible answers to this puzzle, through original survey experiments conducted in Brazil and Canada, while exploring the possible impact of contextual and cultural differences between them.
First, we focus on how partisanship may condition attitudes towards corruption. Do voters judge the same offense in a different way if the politician accused of wrongdoing belongs to their preferred party? And if so, does political knowledge compensate for the partisan bias? Finally, we focus on the supply side and political disaffection to test if citizens keep voting on corrupt candidates because they feel the other options are just as corrupt.
Research on coalition formation as well as on vote choice in the presence of coalitions has focused on the characteristics of potential coalitions, especially their ideological positions. Moreover, their attitudes towards both sets of parties matter considerably more than ideological proximity.
What are the long-term effects of terrorism on political attitudes? This paper examines the effect of terror attacks occurring during the period in which people come of age on their political attitudes later in life. The analysis highlights the role of the context in which terrorism takes place. Sometimes these conceptions clash. When that happens, what should the good representative do? We have developed a never before tested research design to determine which of these three conceptions citizens adhere to. For the quality of democracy, and for realizing good representation, voters should choose parties or candidates based on their values and ideological positions.
In this paper, we investigate differences in proximity voting between men and women. We make use of the data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems to analyse levels of left-right proximity voting among men and women, as well as gender differences in the determinants of proximity voting. Polls in Brazil do have well-known problems, such as accusations of bias and a lack of transparency in regards to sampling methods and a reliance on quotas, that could make them more likely to commit larger errors. We, however, argue that there are also systematic factors that make polling especially difficult in Brazil, namely, last-minute vote buying.
This vote buying, in fact, results in predictable biases that are detectable by looking at financial imbalances between candidates in a given race. A comparative study of policy congruence between parliaments and citizens of immigrant origin. A large set of research asks whether and how the presence of representatives belonging to excluded groups such as minorities of immigrant origin enhances policy responsiveness towards these groups. In this paper, I show that growing numbers of legislators with immigrant backgrounds can succeed in shifting the parliamentary agenda closer to the ideal points of citizens of immigrant descent, but only within two important boundaries: the absence of a negative critical mass and low party discipline.
For this purpose, I analyze panel data from seven European Democracies between and using first-difference models. The classification of electoral winners and losers in Canada, Spain and Germany. Elections are based on political equality but creates inequality as they produce winners and losers. How should we classify electoral winner and loser? The literature offers three main answers: focusing on 1 votes, 2 seats or 3 cabinet.
However, political scientists have no clue whether these classifications correspond to the subjective idea of voters, that is, whether they consider that they won or lost the election. In this presentation, we use a never-seen-before survey question to test which way we can identify who is a loser and who is a winner. Independence Referendums: secession preventing or inducing? The research uncovers the effects of independence referendums on secessionist dynamics.
It uses a quantitative and qualitative mixed-method approach which includes the creation of a new dataset on secessionist movements and independence referendums from to , and an in-depth study of the two Quebec independence referendums of and , and the Montenegrin referendum on independence of This study investigates how elections and its outcomes affect the dynamics in political trust throughout the electoral cycle.
Combining data from seven waves of the European Social Survey with election level and party- election level outcome characteristics of elections, allows investigating this linkage in a multilevel design with individuals nested in electoral periods from 30 European democracies.
The main findings show that levels of political trust generally fluctuate throughout an electoral cycle with elections giving a boost to the levels of political trust. No main effect of seat volatility is found when comparing between electoral period levels of political trust within countries. When only looking at the period immediately after the elections, higher levels of seat volatility enlarge the boosting effect of elections on the levels of political trust. Differences between electoral winners and losers are mainly driven by incumbent support.
A given voter is expected to evaluate all parties using the same issue criteria. The impact of issues can vary between citizens and contexts, but is normally considered to be constant across parties. Voters should rely more strongly on issues which are frequently associated with a given party and for which its issue stances are better known. Our analysis of the European elections offer strong support for these hypotheses. These findings imply an important modification of standard proximity models of electoral competition and party choice.
L’élection au village dans la France du XIXe siècle. Réflexions à partir du cas finistérien
Being a deputy is a job, and as in all jobs, recruitment is affected by job conditions. Electoral participation in the democratic world is generally low with about one voter in three not casting a vote in a typical election. Concerned with low turnout, some countries have adopted laws making voting compulsory. How successful compulsory voting is in enhancing voter turnout? Using census and participation data from Brazil and building on a unique institutional design that imposes compulsory voting on some voters but not others, we estimate the impact of compulsory voting on turnout.
The findings indicate that compulsory voting exerts a very strong effect on turnout, increasing it by about 20 percentage points. This finding carries important implications for policymakers concerned with the decline in turnout in contemporary democracies. Fiscal Rules are a relatively new type of institutions controlling the government budgetary process.
They set numerical targets on four government budget aggregates: Debt, Deficit, Expenditure, Revenues. Relatively rare until the s, fiscal rules have spread rapidly around the world in the last 25 years. Surprisingly, there is very little research exploring why fiscal rules are created. Current explanation assumes that government bind their own hand to limit their ability to use budget deficits to increase their election prospects. This logic is counter-intuitive and unsatisfactory.
Our research identifies and test a large set of potential mechanisms explaining diffusion of fiscal rules. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, we have identified the most likely mechanism explaining the spread of fiscal rules. This presentation combines the result of three papers on fiscal rules origins. The first part of the presentation uses the European setting to test mechanism from the economic and from the diffusion literature. The second part of the presentation first confirm previous result outside of the EU and explore the possibility that the creation mechanism of fiscal rules can affect their ability to influence government budgets.
Yet the fans were more inclined to think that Messi was the best player. In this study we investigate the reasons why the fans prefer Messi over Ronaldo. Tuesday March 7 Filip Kostelka. A new perspective on electoral accountability. Retrospective voting is one of the most investigated theories of voting behaviour. However, previous studies towards this theory only focused on incumbent evaluations to matter for the party choice — neglecting performance evaluations to matter for opposition parties as well. This study argues that performance voting should be investigated at the level of political parties.
The results indicate that satisfaction with the previously endorsed party influences the vote choice for incumbent and opposition parties alike. Multiwinner voting rules take as input preferences over candidates and return sets of candidates of fied size k. In reality : such is almost never the case. Some rules use approval-type instead of preference-type input. We study 6 such rules and illustrate what they produce in simulations, using the EUclidean model, and on real data, using 84 political elections, each of whom has between and voters and between 6 and 9 parties.
Giscard d'Estaing, J. Lang, F. Le Pen, 3 fois. Paris F. Canal J. En septembre, R. Herbert A.
Lecanuet augmentait. Jay G. Une analyse comparative, France, Grande- Bretagne, Belgique, Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, , notamment chap. Private Interest and Public Action. Princeton, Princeton University Press, , p. Voir Lynda L. Sanders, Mediated Politics in Two Cultures. Maxwell E. Mc Combs, Donald L. Summer, , pp. Shanto I. Yengar, Donald R. Joffre Dumazedier, Vers une Civilisation des loisirs? Voir P. Champagne, Faire l'opinion, op. Philippe J. Une analyse analogue est faite des rapports entre journalistes et dirigeants paysans par Sylvain Maresca, Les Dirigeants paysans.
F, et le R. Ainsi, le M. R3" pour F. Strodthoff, R. Hankins, Clay A. L, , pp. Radio-France, audition publique par le C.